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Abstract 
Job insecurity can have wide-ranging consequences outside of the labour market. We here argue that 
it reduces fertility amongst the employed. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande tax, paid by large 
private firms when they laid off workers aged over 50, produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity 
for younger workers in these firms. A difference-in-differences analysis of French ECHP data reveals 
that this greater job insecurity for these under-50s significantly reduced their probability of having a 
new child by 3.9 percentage points. Reduced fertility is only found at the intensive margin: job 
insecurity reduces family size but not the probability of parenthood itself. Our results also suggest 
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1. Introduction
The second demographic transition has produced sharply lower fertility rates. In OECD 
countries this fertility drop has been from 2.7 children per woman in 1970 to 1.7 in 2014; the 
fertility rate has been below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman since 1983 
(OECD, 2016). Without any change in immigration, a lower fertility rate reduces the long-run 
supply of labour in the economy and therefore the tax base (Bloom et al., 2010). Low fertility 
rates also pose public-finance problems, particularly in the context of rising life expectancy, 
with retirement income and medical care being partially financed by taxes on the (smaller) 
younger working population. 
An extensive literature addresses the demographic and socioeconomic factors that lie 
behind fertility decisions. Kohler et al. (2006) split these into three categories: the 
socioeconomic incentives to delay childbearing (the role of financial incentives on fertility, as 
in Cohen et al., 2013, and Laroque and Salanié, 2014, and investment in education that provides 
insurance in the labour market but delays fertility), the social context (such as others’ fertility), 
and institutions. These latter include, among others, labour-market rigidities, the quality of 
child-care support and gender roles. As shown in Del Boca (2002), less child-care support and 
a limited number of part-time jobs may explain both the low fertility and female participation 
rates in Italy between 1991 and 1995; in Costa-Font et al. (2018) parental-leave benefits and 
the regional availability of childcare facilities predict fertility.1  
It is equally well-known that fertility responds sharply to major exogenous events such as 
civil wars and famines. In Agadjanian and Prata (2002) fertility in Angola in the 1990s fell 
during wartime but rebounded post-war, while Lindstrom and Berhanu (1999) note short-run 
falls in fertility in periods of famine and political instability in Ethiopia over the same period. 
1 A separate literature has underlined the role of subjective well-being as a determinant of fertility. In Margolis 
and Myrskylä (2015) the well-being around the birth of the first child predicts future fertility, while Cetre et al. 
(2016) use long-run German SOEP data to show that life satisfaction prior to first birth predicts the probability of 
being a parent by the age of 45.  
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Nobles et al. (2018) use individual-level Indonesian data to show that the probability of having 
a new child rose between 2006 and 2009, after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, both for mothers 
who lost a child in the tsunami and for women who were childless in 2004. 
It is widely argued that the long-run fall in fertility is a response to the first demographic 
transition, that of declining mortality (see Kirk, 1996, for a detailed description of the 
demographic transition theory): lower perinatal and child mortality rates led to fewer births. In 
this sense, insecurity in terms of survival produced more children. A recent example is Wilde 
et al. (2019), who find that antimalarial nets led to lower fertility in South Africa. 
We here relate fertility to an individual’s feelings of economic insecurity about their future, 
rather than their past exposure to a negative shock: our insecurity here is thus forward-looking. 
There is by now widespread agreement that economic insecurity has a considerable effect on 
individuals. Existing work in this area has considered the links between insecurity and obesity 
(Smith et al., 2013), suicide rates (Reeves et al., 2014), mental health (Rohde et al., 2016), gun 
violence in US schools (Pah et al., 2017), health (Caroli and Godard, 2016; Lepinteur, 2018) 
and voting behaviour and political preferences (Bossert et al., 2019). 
Rajan (1999) and Sommer (2016) both propose theoretical models of fertility and 
economic insecurity. The birth of a child implies irreversible expenditures and is more likely 
to be abandoned or postponed by (potential) parents when they face economic uncertainty. A 
body of empirical work has uncovered a negative correlation between fertility and aggregate 
measures that arguably reflect insecurity: the OECD country-level unemployment rate, 
unemployment benefits and maternity benefits in Adsera (2004); country-level unemployment 
rates and production volatility in Hondroyiannis (2010); the US State unemployment rate in 
Schneider (2015); the regional unemployment and redundancy rates after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in Chevalier and Marie (2017); and the State-cohort volatility of income growth in Chabé-
Ferret and Gobbi (2018). 
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At the individual level, fertility has also been shown to fall with subjective measures of 
insecurity (perceived job security in Scherer, 2009, and worries about own economic situation 
in Kreyenfeld, 2015) as well as objective individual measures of insecurity such as persistent 
joblessness in Busetta et al. (2019) and being on a fixed-term contract in Adsera (2004), De la 
Rica and Iza (2005), Kind and Kleibrink (2013), Modena et al. (2014), Auer and Danzer (2016), 
Guner et al. (2019) and Lopes (2020). 
We here make use of an exogenous rise in job insecurity following a change in 
employment-protection legislation uncovered by Georgieff and Lepinteur (2018). We share 
some similarities with Bignon and García Peñalosa (2018), who link a rise in Agricultural 
protection in 19th Century France (via a tariff on imported grain) to subsequent lower education 
but higher fertility. Their analysis is at the regional level, and their exogenous intensity of 
treatment is the importance of cereal production at the regional level. However, the channel 
they emphasise is the sharp rise in Agricultural wages relative to those in Manufacturing, and 
its consequences on the trade-off between the quality (education) and quantity of children; they 
do not link protectionism to employment or income insecurity. The only individual-level causal 
analyses of which we are aware both use German data. Hofmann and Hohmeyer (2013) argue 
that the introduction of the Hartz 4 reforms in 2004 in Germany produced greater worries about 
the individual’s own economic situation and so reduced fertility between 2000 and 2005. 
Klemm (2012) appeals to the introduction of German civil-service jobs, with their associated 
security, in the former East Germany: women who become civil servants there were more likely 
to have a (new) child.2  
We propose what we believe to be the first difference-in-differences analysis of a quasi-
natural experiment to establish a causal effect of individual job insecurity on fertility. While 
2 Although this fertility effect was also found in West Germany (and thus could reflect selection). Klemm’s 
argument is that there is less selection in allocation to (new) civil-service jobs in East Germany. 
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most of the literature cited above has related fertility (or other) outcomes to objective measures 
of insecurity (e.g. unemployment benefits or income-growth volatility) or past life events (e.g. 
unemployment), we consider a pure forward-looking effect of insecurity (here related to the 
job) on future fertility: our analysis sample consists only of workers, some of whom were more 
threatened than others by the probability of future job loss following a French labour-market 
reform.3 
We follow the method described in Georgieff and Lepinteur (2018), and use 1994-2001 
French data from the European Household Community Panel (ECHP) to show that the 1999 
rise in the French Delalande tax on layoffs of the over-50s increased job insecurity for the 
under-50s in large firms (as compared to the under-50s in small firms, where the Delalande tax 
did not change in 1999). We consider respondents who are married and cohabiting, and find 
that this greater job insecurity in turn reduced the probability of having a new child in this 
group by four percentage points. We check the robustness of our estimates by ruling out 
potential confounding factors such as macroeconomic trends or the 35-hour workweek that was 
introduced in France in 2000. We also show that our estimates are not qualitatively sensitive 
to the estimation method and to changes in the sample. Last, the fall in fertility due to job 
insecurity is the same by gender and age, but is only found for workers with relatively high 
wages, higher education and those who were already parents before the reform. These results 
are in line with negative selection into parenthood during periods of uncertainty (as in 
Chevalier and Marie, 2017). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background and the identification strategy for our analysis of individual-level insecurity, and 
3 Most measures of (in)security seem to be backward-looking, in that they are based on past or current outcomes 
(rather than the uncertainty associated with future ones). This is also the case for the index of food security 
proposed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which is based on food availability and the 
household’s economic resources. In OECD (1997) job insecurity is rather expressed as a function of the expected 
loss that would result from losing one’s current job; across countries subjective reported job insecurity is indeed 
found to be negatively correlated with unemployment-benefit generosity.  
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Section 3 the ECHP data. The main results then appear in Section 4, and the robustness checks 
and heterogeneity analysis in Section 5. Last, Section 6 concludes. 
2. Institutional Background and identification strategy
The Delalande tax was introduced into French Law in 1987 to help restore financial 
balance to the unemployment-insurance system and reduce the rise in the layoffs of older 
workers. Despite a number of changes over time, the experience-rating principle of the tax has 
remained unchanged: firms that lay off workers of over a certain age have to pay the Delalande 
tax to the unemployment-insurance system. This tax is proportional to the laid-off worker's 
gross wage and is applied to private-sector workers with permanent contracts. From its 
introduction in 1987 up to 1992, this tax was three months of gross wages for all workers aged 
55 and over who were laid off. 
The first major changes to this tax were introduced in July 1992. Table 1 shows how the 
Delalande tax has changed over time as a function of the age of the worker who is laid-off and 
the size of the firm. While the initial 1987-1992 tax applied to firms of all sizes, in July 1992 
the tax became differentiated by firm size. In addition, the age at which the tax started to apply 
fell from 55 to 50, and the maximum tax amount rose to six months of gross wages. However, 
workers who were hired after age 50 and who had been unemployed for at least three months 
were exempt from the tax. Additional changes to the tax scheme were made in January 1993 
and January 1999. From 1993 to December 1998, the tax was a function only of worker age 
and not of firm size. In January 1999, the tax was increased, but only for firms with over 50 
employees. This increase was announced by the French government one year beforehand. The 
Delalande tax was finally abolished in 2008. 
Behaghel (2007) proposes a stochastic job-matching model to predict the impact of the 
changes to the Delalande tax; this shows that a rise in the Delalande tax will reduce the 
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separation rate of those workers covered by the reform but will increase that of the younger 
workers in the same firms. Georgieff and Lepinteur (2018) use the same ECHP data as we do 
here, and confirm empirically that the 1999 rise in the Delalande tax had perverse effects on 
younger (aged under 50) workers in larger French firms by increasing both their perceived job 
insecurity and their actual risk of layoff (relative to the covered older workers). 
Our main goal here is to assess the causal effect of these exogenous changes in job security 
from the tax reform on worker's fertility decisions. To do so, we exploit the firm-size 
discontinuity and the perverse effects on younger workers induced by the 1999 Delalande tax 
reform: the layoff tax paid to the unemployment-insurance system rose for firms with 50 or 
more employees but remained unchanged for firms with under 50 employees. This reform then 
provides a natural quasi-experimental design for difference-in-differences (D-i-D) estimation, 
in which younger workers in large firms are the treatment group and younger workers in 
smaller firms are the control group. 
The 1999 rise in the Delalande tax was announced by the French government one year 
beforehand (in early 1998), and the reintroduction of the firm-size discontinuity was also public 
knowledge by the end of 1998 (ECHP interviews took place in November and December of 
each year). As such, employers may have been able to strategically adjust their labour demand 
before the change in the Law. Georgieff and Lepinteur (2018) do identify anticipation effects, 
in that employers in treated firms laid off relatively more workers just after the announcement 
of the reform but prior to its implementation. This spike in layoffs is seen for the over-50s, but 
also for younger workers: the forthcoming higher layoff tax seems to have provoked some 
restructuring in larger firms. As such, job insecurity for the under-50s may well have started to 
rise even before the official implementation of the reform. We account for a potential 
announcement effect by estimating the following difference-in-differences equation, where we 
allow for a post-1998 treatment effect as well as an announcement effect of the reform in 1998: 
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝜆1998 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡1998𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  ε𝑖𝑡 (1) 
Here 𝑌𝑖𝑡 first represents the subjective job security of worker i in year t: in the spirit of 
Georgieff and Lepinteur (2018), we will show that the 1999 rise in the Delalande tax 
significantly reduced the job security of younger workers in treated firms (here concentrating 
on the married and cohabiting only). Second, 𝑌𝑖𝑡 will be a dummy for worker i having had a 
new child during year t. The variable Treatit is the treatment dummy, and is one if the worker 
is in a large firm (50+ employees) and zero in smaller firms. The variable Post1998t is a dummy 
for observations after January 1999 (the implementation date of the higher Delalande tax), λt 
are year fixed effects (so that λ1998 refers to the policy-announcement year of 1998) and Xit is a 
vector of standard individual socio-demographic controls. This includes age dummies (in five-
year bands), past fertility (as measured by a dummy for the (lagged) presence of children in the 
household),4 self-reported health status (on a one to five scale), weekly working hours, the log 
of the (nominal) monthly wage, and occupation and region dummies. This equation also 
controls for individual fixed effects µi. The year dummies in equation (1) entirely subsume the 
main effects of λ1998 and Post1998t. The coefficients of interest in the above equation are α2 
and α3, which respectively capture the effects of the reform’s announcement in 1998 and its 
implementation starting in 1999 on first job security and then fertility. 
As we expect the effect of the reform’s announcement and implementation to be of the 
same sign, we also estimate the following difference-in-differences regression: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡1997𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + ε𝑖𝑡 (2) 
4 Not controlling for the lagged presence of children in the household does not affect our estimates. These results 
are available upon request. 
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where the variable Post1997t is a dummy for observations after January 1998 (the date of the 
announcement of the higher Delalande tax). In this specification the coefficient β2 will capture 
what we call the total effect of the reform, starting from its announcement (and thus 
corresponds to the regression in equation (1) with α2 = α3). 
3. Data and Estimation Sample
Our data come from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which is a 
longitudinal survey covering 15 European countries, including France. A nationally-
representative sample of household and individuals was interviewed each year between 1994 
and 2001 in each country. In France, an average of 15,000 individuals were surveyed per wave. 
The interviews mainly took place between November and December. 
The ECHP contains detailed information on respondents’ socio-economic characteristics, 
income, employment conditions, social relations and so on.5 At each wave respondents reported 
the number of new-born children in their household since the last survey wave. This will be 
our fertility measure. 
The 1999 rise in the Delalande tax only applied to firms with over 50 employees. The size 
of the firm in which the respondent works, measured by the number of employees in the firm, 
is recorded in the following categories: “None”, “1 to 4”, “5 to 19”, “20 to 49”, “50 to 99”, 
“100 to 499” and “500 or more”. The ECHP also contains a number of questions on satisfaction 
with various job domains. Our measure of perceived job security comes from the following 
question: 
“How satisfied are you with your present job in terms of job security?” 
5 More details are available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-community-household-panel. 
10 
The answers were given on a 6-point scale, with 1 referring to “Not Satisfied” and 6 “Fully 
Satisfied”. This measure of perceived job security is a strong predictor of individual choices 
such as future job quits (Clark, 2001) and reflects objective changes in layoff and hiring rates 
(Böckerman et al., 2011). It has also been shown to be related to permanent contracts, 
unemployment-insurance benefits and employment protection legislation (Clark and Postel-
Vinay, 2009). 
We consider adult respondents working in the private sector with permanent contracts, and 
with valid information on the sociodemographic variables, job characteristics and perceived 
job security. We in addition restrict the sample to married workers under age 50 who live in 
the same household as their partner, both before and after the reform. This leaves us with 4,698 
observations on 1,040 different individuals from 1995 to 2001 (we cannot use the first 1994 
wave of ECHP here as the number of new-borns in the household is missing). The descriptive 
statistics for our final analysis sample appear in Table 2. The split into the treated and control 
groups is almost exactly 50:50. With respect to our two dependent variables, a little under seven 
percent of our under-50 married workers had a new child over the past year and average job 
security on the one-to-six scale is just over four. Figure A1 in the Online Appendix shows the 
distribution of subjective job security. It can be seen that 70% of responses were 4 or 5. This 
negative skewness is common for satisfaction measures. 
4. Main Results
We set the scene by considering the relationship between fertility and employment 
protection legislation (EPL) over time in OECD countries. Figure 1 shows the trends in fertility 
in OECD countries, and in France in particular. The OECD fertility rate has dropped 
spectacularly, from over three in the early 1960s to two in the mid-1980s, and has hovered 
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around the 1.7 level for the past 20 years. The French fertility rate also fell sharply from 1960 
up to a low of 1.7 in the mid-1990s, but has since recovered to a figure of 2. 
We relate fertility to Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in a panel of 34 OECD 
countries from 1985 to 2014.6 The OECD EPL measure is a synthetic indicator that accounts 
for the strictness of regulation on dismissals for regular contracts. For more information and a 
complete description of the method, see www.oecd.org/employment/protection.7  
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between OECD employment protection in t and 
the fertility rates in t+1 and t+2. The top part of this table refers to the association between the 
fertility rate in t+1 and employment protection legislation (EPL) in t. This is first calculated 
without any controls in column (1). We then add year fixed-effects and country fixed-effects 
in columns (2) and (3) respectively, and finally both at the same time in the last column. There 
is no significant relationship between EPL and fertility in the first two columns. However, 
controlling for country fixed effects produces positive and very significant estimates (so that 
there is an omitted country-level variable that is correlated in opposite directions with EPL and 
fertility). The estimates in columns (3) and (4) thus suggest that, within country, greater EPL 
today is associated with higher fertility one year later. The bottom part of Table 3 carries out 
the same analysis for the fertility rate at t+2, which produces very similar results (fertility rates 
being highly serially-correlated). 
The country-level correlations in Table 3 are not causal. While we have checked that the 
fertility rate in t-1 does not predict EPL values in t (these results are available upon request), 
we cannot rule out within-country time-varying omitted factors that are correlated in the same 
direction with both fertility and EPL. As such, we will now turn to the fertility effect of an 
6 This EPL time-series is complete for only 21 out of 34 countries, as some countries (e.g. Korea and Israel) joined 
the OECD after 1985. Excluding these “new-joiner” countries from the analysis does not affect our estimates. 
7 A related literature has used cross-country data to look at the relationship between policies that are designed to 
protect individuals against labour-market insecurity and subjective well-being. Some examples are Carr and 
Chung (2014), Di Tella et al. (2003) and Easterlin (2013). 
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exogenous change in employment protection (and therefore job security) following the 1999 
rise in the Delalande tax in France. 
Table 4 first shows how reported job security changes with employment protection in the 
French sample of married and cohabiting workers in the ECHP panel data. This is based on the 
estimation sample described in Table 2. Job security is measured on a one-to-six scale. 
Columns (1) and (2) of this table refer to the difference-in-differences estimates of equation 
(1), where we allow for a post-1998 treatment effect as well as an announcement effect of the 
reform in 1998; the results in columns (3) and (4) come from the estimation of equation (2), 
where the announcement and implementation dummies are combined into a “total” effect. 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 show the results without controls, and columns (2) and (4) 
those with controls. The introduction of controls makes almost no difference to the estimates. 
The 1999 rise in the layoff tax for older workers in larger firms significantly reduced the 
perceived job security of younger workers in larger firms (as compared to younger workers in 
smaller firms, where there was no change in the layoff tax). This lower job security for the 
married and cohabiting younger workers is seen both after the announcement and the 
implementation of the rise in the Delalande tax (as was the case for the sample of workers of 
all marital statuses in Georgieff and Lepinteur, 2018). Pairwise Wald-tests confirm that the 
estimated announcement and implementation effects of the reform in rows 1 and 2 are not 
statistically different from each other. Columns (3) and (4) then combine these into the total 
effect of the reform, which is naturally negative and significant and of a similar size to the 
figures in columns (1) and (2). We estimate that the higher Delalande tax reduced the perceived 
job security of younger workers in treated firms by around one-sixth of a standard deviation.8 
8 We also looked at the effect of the announcement and implementation of the 1999 rise on the Delalande tax on 
the actual layoff probabilities of married and cohabiting workers using data from the French Labour Survey. As 
for all marital statuses in Georgieff and Lepinteur (2018), we find positive and significant estimates from 1998 
onwards (see Figure A2).   
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Table 5 then estimates the relationship between job insecurity and fertility (the probability 
of having had a new child over the past year) using the same estimation sample.9 Columns (1) 
to (4) reproduce the specifications in Table 4. All of the estimated coefficients in columns (1) 
and (2) are negative. Those for the reform implementation are significantly so at the five per 
cent level, while those for reform announcement (as they are measured over only one year) 
have higher standard errors. The pairwise Wald-tests again reveal that the anticipation and 
implementation effects of the reform are statistically identical. The results when these are 
combined in columns (3) and (4) show that the higher Delalande tax reduced the probability of 
having a new child by just under four percentage points. This is sizeable, representing around 
60% of the mean probability of a new birth in the estimation sample (see Table 2). As in Table 
4, the introduction of sociodemographic controls makes barely any difference. This is to be 
expected: if the assignment to the treatment is random, the inclusion of additional controls will 
not affect the coefficients but should increase the precision of the estimates. 
One of the requirements for D-i-D estimation to produce causal effects is that of a common 
trend in the dependent variable (here the probability of a new birth) in the control and treatment 
groups prior to the policy change. Figure 2 plots the mean birth probability over time for the 
two groups. The probability trends in the treatment and control groups are similar pre-treatment 
(as is indeed the level), supporting the common-trend assumption. We have also carried out a 
placebo regression to test the common-trend assumption. In the placebo experiment we only 
look at the pre-announcement years and assume that the rise in the Delalande tax came into 
force one year earlier (i.e. in 1997), and so compare fertility in 1995 and 1996 to that in 1997. 
9 The full set of results, including the estimated coefficients on all of the control variables, appears in Appendix 
Table A1. 
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The point estimate  in column (1) of Table A2 is not statistically significant, supporting the 
common-trend assumption in fertility.10 
The estimates in Table 4 and the first four columns of Table 5 then show that higher layoff 
taxes for older workers reduced both the perceived job security and birth probability of younger 
workers in the affected firms. It can however be argued that this fall in fertility might not result 
from greater job insecurity but rather changes in other individual characteristics. We address 
this concern in two ways. We first show in Table A3 that the differences in observable 
characteristics between the control and treatment groups remain the same before and after the 
announcement of the 1999 rise in the Delalande tax. Second, we re-estimate the regressions in 
columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 adding perceived job security as an additional control. If the fall 
in fertility from the higher Delalande tax is due only to greater feelings of job insecurity, 
controlling for the latter should render the treatment effects equal to zero. These new estimates 
appear in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5. It is indeed the case that holding job insecurity 
constant, the reform did not change fertility: lower fertility then seems to result from 
exogenously-higher job insecurity. 
Our preferred treatment effect, that in column (4) of Table 5, is -0.040, which represents a 
reduction of 57% from the pre-reform fertility rate in our estimation sample. We will carry out 
a series of robustness checks in the next sub-section in which the lowest value of the treatment 
effect is -0.030. Our estimated effect of the 1999 rise in the Delalande tax then lies between 
42% and 57% of the average pre-reform fertility rate. This figure might seem large, but is 
comparable to the estimated magnitudes of arguably similar variables. In Modena et al. (2014), 
the effects of unemployment and job instability respectively reduce the average fertility rate by 
10 Figure A3 in the Online Appendix plots the time profile of average perceived job security in the treatment and 
control group, providing supporting evidence for the parallel-trend assumption here as well. The right-hand part 
of Table A2 also shows the same placebo experiment as discussed in the text for job security. Both Figure A3 and 
Table A2 reveal parallel job-security trends pre-reform. 
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40% and 60%. In Hofmann and Hohmeyer (2013), “strong” perceived economic uncertainty 
was estimated to reduce fertility by between 25% and 50% of the average rate. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall in Chevalier and Marie (2017) reduced the annual crude birth rate by almost 50%. 
In Klemm (2012), being a civil servant has a somewhat lower impact, increasing the average 
fertility rate by 26%. We can also benchmark our insecurity effect using the other estimated 
coefficients in our fertility regressions. The estimated reform effect is 60% smaller than that of 
already having at least one child in the household. Equally, the drop in perceived job security 
due to the 1999 rise in the Delalande tax is half of that due to being in a small firm (with under 
50 employees). 
5. Robustness Checks and Heterogeneity
The results in Tables 4 and 5 referred to the effect of the reform on job security and fertility 
for the whole analysis sample of married and cohabiting workers. We here present a number 
of robustness and heterogeneity tests, and also ask whether the fertility effects of job insecurity 
are more pronounced for certain types of workers. All of our analysis refers to the total effect 
of the reform, as in equation (2).11 All of these robustness and heterogeneity tests will also be 
carried out for the estimated reform effect on perceived job security, with the results appearing 
in Appendix Tables A4 and A5. 
a. Robustness Checks
i. Ruling out confounding shocks
One potential issue in our estimation is the French reform of the hours in the mandatory 
work week. In 1998, the French Ministry of Labour announced a reduction in the standard 
11 The results of the robustness and heterogeneity analyses when we split the reform up into announcement and 
implementation effects are very similar, and are available upon request. 
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workweek from 39 to 35 hours in companies with more than 20 employees. This could 
potentially have affected the perceived job security of workers in those firms. To ensure that 
the lower job security following the Delalande tax does not pick up the 35-hour week, we re-
run the baseline regression excluding workers in firms with under 20 employees (so that all of 
the individuals in our estimation sample are equally-affected by the 35-hour week). This 
restriction drops 566 observations (12% of the initial estimation sample). The estimated reform 
coefficient in column (1) of Table 6 is somewhat smaller than that in the baseline (in column 
(4) of Table 5). It may be that this smaller coefficient reflects a change in the composition of 
working time in the restricted sample. Table A3 shows that the differences in working time and 
in the probability of working part-time between the treatment and control groups were the same 
before and after the reform’s announcement. When we replicate this exercise for the sample 
excluding workers in firms with under 20 employees, the same conclusion holds (these results 
are available upon request). The treatment effects in column (1) of Table 6 and column (4) of 
Table 5 are then unlikely to reflect confounding changes in working time. Last, although the 
estimate in Table 6 is smaller, the difference from the baseline treatment effect is not 
statistically significant. 
We would also like to ensure that our results reflect the effect of the French layoff-tax 
reforms, rather than some broader macro-economic developments. We test for the latter by re-
running our baseline regressions on similar samples of workers in neighbouring countries, as 
the ECHP is harmonised across European countries. Data limitations restrict this comparison 
to Spain and Italy.12 The analogous difference-in-difference estimates in these two countries 
appear in columns (2) and (3) of Table 6. The estimated coefficients here are positive or 
essentially zero (rather than significantly negative, as in France) and neither is significant. We 
12 The information in the last waves of the ECHP in Belgium and Germany does not allow us to accurately 
distinguish the public and private sectors and to measure perceived job security. 
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also carry out this exercise for Denmark, which had both fertility rates and an EPL index that 
were comparable to those in France between 1995 and 2001. The D-i-D estimate in column (4) 
is zero. Macroeconomic trends do not then seem to lie behind our result of greater insecurity 
reducing fertility. 
ii. Estimation method
We now ask how the use of individual fixed effects in the above analyses affects our 
results. Fixed-effects and OLS estimates can differ for two main reasons. First, fixed-effects 
models introduce attenuation bias in the case of measurement error, so that the OLS estimates 
are larger than their FE counterparts in absolute terms. There is also omitted-variable bias: the 
OLS estimates will be biased if the treatment is correlated with unobserved individual time-
invariant characteristics. The baseline results without fixed effects in column (5) of Table 6 are 
somewhat smaller in absolute terms than the baseline fixed-effect estimates, but not 
significantly so. 
We then consider whether these results are affected by the treatment of the dependent 
fertility variable. Our baseline regressions treat fertility as a cardinal variable (and are thus 
fixed-effect linear-probability models). As the dependent variable is a dummy, non-linear 
models may be more appropriate. The results in column (6) of Table 6 come from the re-
estimation of our main regression via a conditional fixed-effect logit model, which continues 
to produce a negative significant estimated coefficient, so that job insecurity reduces fertility. 
iii. Alternative control groups
We above used workers in smaller firms (under 50 employees), who were not affected by 
the change in the layoff tax, as the control group to establish the effect of the reform on the 
treated workers in larger firms. We can check our findings using public-sector employees as 
controls: as they were not covered by the Delalande tax, we assume that their perceived job 
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security was unaffected. Column (7) of Table 6 shows that the resulting estimated coefficient 
is very similar to the baseline estimate. 
iv. Sample composition
The coefficients in Table 5 are estimated using a sample of married and cohabiting workers 
aged below 50 living in the same household as their partner. It may be thought to be more 
appropriate to run our analysis at the couple level in order to avoid double-counting. We 
therefore re-estimate the treatment effect in column (8) using only one observation per couple 
per year and controlling for both partners’ demographic variables (we here use the Missing 
Indicator method if there are missing values for a variable). We consider a couple to be treated 
if at least one of its members was affected by the reform. The estimate in column (8) is very 
similar in size to that from our baseline regressions.13 
As the reform was announced months before its implementation, we may suspect that firms 
strategically adjusted their workforce. To rule out concerns regarding self-selection into the 
treatment, column (9) retains only workers who did not report any change in their firm’s size 
from 1997 onwards. This ends up dropping only around five per cent of the baseline sample, 
and the resulting estimated coefficient on the effect of job insecurity on fertility is only little 
changed.14 
13 A different assignment rule to the treatment group at the couple level could potentially affect these results. 
However, assuming that a couple is treated only if both partners are treated yields results that are qualitatively 
similar: the point estimate for the treatment is -0.036 and its standard error is 0.032. The smaller t-statistic here 
comes almost entirely from the higher standard error, as there are fewer treated couples in which “both parents 
are treated” as compared to “at least one parent is treated”. 
14 The selection into firms of different sizes of workers with different links between fertility and perceived job 
security could also be a problem, especially if fertility is more sensitive to perceived job security in the treatment 
group. To formally test for a different link between perceived job security and fertility by firm size we use the 
pre-reform years and estimate the following empirical model: 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐽𝑆𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡. A significant α3 here would suggest a difference in the link between job security and fertility by
firm size. None of the estimates of α3 in a variety of models (with and without controls, with and without fixed 
effects) are significantly different from zero. These results are available upon request. 
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A related issue is that firm size is self-reported and may be inaccurate (so that we 
mistakenly assign some individuals to the control or treatment groups). This firm-size 
misreporting will not be a problem if it is random; however, if it is not our treatment effects 
might be biased. We address this issue via a test inspired by the donut regression-discontinuity 
design: we exclude workers who say they work in firms with “20 to 49 employees” or “50 to 
99 employees” and re-estimate the treatment effect. While workers may mis-judge the size of 
their firm at the discontinuity (at 50 employees), it is probably much less likely that they would 
say that they work in a firm with under 20 employees when the firm actually has over 100 
employees (and vice versa). The baseline and “donut” estimates in the last column of Table 6 
below are the same, alleviating worries about the mis-reporting of firm size. 
We last address the issue of attrition. From the announcement of the reform onwards, 12% 
of our treatment group leaves the estimation sample before the last wave (this figure is the same 
in the control group). We may worry that the probability of leaving the sample is not 
independent of the reform’s implementation and that our fertility estimates might be biased, 
especially if the birth probability of leavers rises after they leave the sample. A first point is 
that the ECHP does supply two weights, both of which are called attrition weights (our main 
regression results do not use weights). Applying these attrition weights does not change the 
nature of our results. 
Along the same lines as Georgieff and Lepinteur (2018), we can also calibrate the 
“unobserved” difference-in-difference that would be required in the attrition group in order to 
produce a main estimate of zero: this is 0.29 (= 0.04*88%/12%). Our main result is that the 
gap in fertility between workers in large and small firms fell by 4 percentage points after the 
reform. For those who attrit to cancel this figure out, we would need the fertility gap between 
workers in large and small firms in this group to rather rise by 29 percentage points after the 
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reform. With an average observed birth probability in our estimation sample of only 0.07, this 
seems implausible. 
b. Heterogeneity
The D-i-D estimates in Table 5 show the average treatment effect for all workers in large 
firms: Table 7 then asks whether these effects differ across groups. We first interact the total 
reform effect with a dummy for women and for workers born before 1959. The resulting 
estimates appear respectively in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7: neither interaction term is 
significant.15 
Along the same lines, we then interact the effect of the reform with “High-wage” and 
“High-education” dummies, corresponding respectively to workers with above-median pre-
reform wages and with post-secondary education before the reform. The estimates in columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 7 underline that the fertility effect of job insecurity is concentrated among 
workers with high wages and high education.16 
Our last interactions concern the family before the reform. Column (5) shows the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction with a dummy for the treated workers having children before the 
announcement of the higher Delalande tax. This coefficient is negative and significant: the 
effect of job insecurity on fertility is thus stronger at the intensive margin (for those who were 
already parents before the reform was introduced) than at the extensive margin. The reform 
effect for those without children in the first row is not statistically different from zero. The 
1999 rise in the Delalande tax, with its concomitant effect on job insecurity for younger workers 
15 1959 is the median birth year in our estimation sample. The interaction terms from different birth-year thresholds 
continue to be insignificant. We also considered age (rather than birth year) as a type of heterogeneity, as fertility 
rates are lower for those over 40, but found no differences in treatment effects across age groups.   
16 We also considered an interaction between the treatment and different measures of wages (a continuous measure 
of monthly log wages and a set of dummies for wage quartiles), which produced similar results; the same applies 
if we use pre-reform household income. We found no evidence of heterogeneity in the negative significant effect 
of the reform on fertility according to other types of pre-reform income (non-work private income, total household 
capital income and total household rental/property income).  
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in larger firms, did not then reduce the likelihood of becoming a parent but did produce smaller 
families for existing parents. This also implies that the reform did not affect the parent’s age at 
first birth. 
Our dummy variable “Parent beforehand” is one if we observe at least one child living in 
the household before the reform announcement. We may face measurement error here, in that 
our older workers could have children who were no longer living in the household at the time 
of the survey. We see whether this is an issue by re-estimating the treatment effects using only 
workers who are arguably less likely to be wrongly-assigned to our “Parent beforehand” group: 
those under the age of 40 at the time of the reform announcement. The results, available upon 
request, are qualitatively similar. Last, column (6) shows the interactions with the number of 
children that the respondent had at the time of the reform. The reduced fertility from job 
insecurity is more evident in larger families.17 
Why does fertility react more in some groups than others? One possibility is that the 
strength of the relationship between the layoff tax and job insecurity may be more pronounced 
for high-wage and better-educated workers, and for those who already have children. We 
consider this in the heterogeneity analysis in Appendix Table A5, where the dependent variable 
is now perceived job security. None of the interaction terms in this table are significantly 
different from zero. All of the different groups of employees in this table then react similarly 
in terms of their perceived job security. 
Alternatively, the link between perceived job security and fertility may differ across 
groups. Using the fall of the Berlin Wall as a natural experiment, Chevalier and Marie (2017) 
show that the fertility decisions of mothers with relatively high education and who are more 
attached to the labour market are more sensitive to economic uncertainty. As such, not only 
17 We also considered heterogeneity by spouse’s labour-force status and employment characteristics (if working), 
without uncovering any significant correlations. 
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was the cohort of children born after the fall of Berlin Wall smaller, but it also changed in 
composition: the children born during this period performed worse according to a range of 
educational outcomes measured between ages 10 and 17. Chevalier and Marie (2017) interpret 
these findings as revealing negative selection into parenthood during periods of uncertainty. 
Our results in Table 7 are in line with this conclusion. Only better-educated and high-wage 
employees had fewer children after the rise in the Delalande tax. Along the same lines, we may 
expect workers who were already parents pre-reform to be more sensitive to uncertainty, as 
they already face the cost of raising children and may be reluctant to face potential financial 
difficulty by having more children in times of greater uncertainty. 
6. Conclusion
Economic uncertainty reduces fertility amongst workers. The 1999 layoff-tax reform in 
the French labour market protected older workers, but to the detriment of younger workers. As 
this reform only applied in larger firms we can carry out a difference-in-differences analysis. 
The exogenous change in the future probability of job loss affected perceived job security; 
greater job insecurity in turn produced a robust significant fall in the probability of having a 
new child. The identification strategy that we use here allows us to identify the fertility effect 
of job insecurity for workers who were employed both before and after the reform, which is 
what most people will understand by insecurity. If at the same time the reform led to job loss, 
which itself is known to be associated with lower fertility, then our estimates above will 
actually be lower bounds for the total effect of the Delalande tax on fertility in France. 
Job insecurity was found to reduce fertility only at the intensive margin and not at the 
extensive margin. In other words, greater job insecurity does not affect the probability of 
parenthood but does produce smaller families in the short-run. Our data allows us to show 
lower fertility over the period 1999-2001; we do not know whether we would find reduced 
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fertility or delayed fertility in the longer-run. While we find no significant differences in this 
fertility effect by gender or age, greater insecurity does affect the composition of the cohorts 
born after the reform, as only high-income and better-educated individuals reduced their 
fertility. 
Last, we have here underlined a negative effect of job insecurity on fertility. Are smaller 
families then necessarily the price to pay for a more flexible labour market? The probability of 
future job loss, which was the source of variation here, is undoubtedly only part of the security 
story: unemployment benefits, the length of the unemployment spell and the quality of the next 
job all matter too. It would be useful to identify whether changes in these latter can mitigate 
the effect of job loss on fertility, so that something like flexicurity can allow both the labour 
market and fertility to work in a way that contributes to sustainable social welfare. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Fertility Rates in France and the OECD: 1960 to 2014 
Notes: The fertility rate is the ratio of the number of children to the number of women of child-
bearing age and comes from the OECD. For more details, see https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-
rates.htm#indicator-chart.  
Figure 2: Average Birth Probability by Treatment Group 
Notes: The short-dashed vertical line indicates the date at which the rise in the Delalande tax was 
announced, while the long-dashed line indicates the date of its implementation. The points on the 
horizontal axis refer to the time of data collection of each ECHP wave (in November to December 
of each year). 
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Table 1: The Delalande Layoff Tax over Time 
Worker’s age 
50 51 52 53 54 55 56-57 58 59 
July 1987-June 1992 All firm sizes 3 3 3 3 
July 1992 - Dec. 1992 
20 or more employees 1 1 2 2 4 5 6 6 6 
Under 20 employees 0.5 0.5 1 1 2 2.5 3 3 3 
Jan 1993-Dec 1998 All firm sizes 1 1 2 2 4 5 6 6 6 
January 1999-2008 
50 or more employees 2 3 5 6 8 10 12 10 8 
Under 50 employees 1 1 2 2 4 5 6 6 6 
Source: Legislative texts. 
Note: For each age group, the table shows the tax to be paid by the firm to the unemployment-insurance system if it lays off a worker 
of that age. The tax is a function of the worker’s wages, and is stated in months of gross wage. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the ECHP Analysis Sample 
Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent Variable: 
Perceived Job Security (1-6) 4.07 1.15 1 6 
Child Birth in the last 12 months 0.07 0 1 
Difference-in-differences Variables: 
Treatment Group 0.49 0 1 
Post Period 0.36 0 1 
Individual Characteristics: 
Age 37.36 5.80 21 49 
Female 0.40 0 1 
High Education 0.22 0 1 
Presence of Children in the HH (lagged) 0.61 0 1 
Health Status 3.85 0.74 1 5 
Job Characteristics: 
Weekly Working Hours 39.40 8.36 4 96 
Monthly Wage (nominal, in log) 9.05 0.51 5.08 11.07 
Observations 4698 
Individuals 1040 
Notes: These numbers refer to French married and cohabiting private-sector workers under the age of 50 without 
missing values in the ECHP 1995-2001. High education is a dummy for post-secondary education. 
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Table 3: Employment Protection Legislation and Fertility at the Country Level – OLS results 
Fertility Rate in t+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPL in t 0.077 0.011 0.197*** 0.152*** 
(0.056) (0.029) (0.035) (0.041) 
Observations 735 735 735 735 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.192 0.919 0.927 
Time FE . Yes . Yes 
Country FE . . Yes Yes 
Fertility Rate in t+2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPL in t 0.095 0.026 0.238*** 0.190*** 
(0.059) (0.033) (0.039) (0.045) 
Observations 735 735 735 735 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.203 0.917 0.925 
Time FE . Yes . Yes 
Country FE . . Yes Yes 
Notes: The data here comes from an unbalanced panel of 34 OECD countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) over the 1985-2014 period. All observations are weighted by population 
size. The measure of EPL is the synthetic indicator of the strictness of regulation on 
dismissals for regular contracts produced by the OECD. For more information and the 
full method, see www.oecd.org/employment/protection. The fertility rate is the ratio of 
the number of children to the number of women of child-bearing age produced by the 
OECD. For more details, see https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm#indicator-
chart. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Table 4: The Delalande Tax and Job Security – Panel Results 
Perceived Job Security 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform Announcement -0.139* -0.140* 
(0.079) (0.080) 
Reform Implementation -0.199*** -0.204*** 
(0.075) (0.075) 
Total Effect of the reform -0.185*** -0.186*** 
(0.067) (0.068) 
Observations 4698 4698 4698 4698 
Individuals 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Controls . Yes . Yes 
Adjusted Within R2 0.008 0.014 0.007 0.014 
Average Perceived Job Security in Control Group 4.070 4.070 4.070 4.070 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 
21 and 49. The announcement effect of the reform considers the treatment from the beginning of 1998, when the 
reform to the Delalande tax was announced, up to its implementation on January 1st 1999; the reform-implementation 
effect considers the implementation treatment starting on January 1st 1999. These two effects correspond to α2 and 
α3 in equation (1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. All of the regressions include 
individual and year fixed-effects. The controls include age dummies (in five-year bands), a dummy for the (lagged) 
presence of children in the household, health status, weekly working hours, the log of the monthly wage, and 
occupation and region dummies. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: The Delalande Tax and Fertility – Panel Results 
Birth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reform Announcement -0.035 -0.038* -0.006 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.063) 
Reform Implementation -0.037** -0.041** -0.009 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.062) 
Total Effect of the reform -0.037** -0.040** -0.008 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.062) 
Observations 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 
Individuals 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Controls . Yes . Yes Yes Yes 
Controlling for Perceived Job Security . . . . Yes Yes 
Adjusted Within R2 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.023 0.024 0.024 
Average Birth Probability in Control Group 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 21 and 49. The 
announcement effect of the reform considers the treatment from the beginning of 1998, when the reform to the Delalande tax was 
announced, up to its implementation on January 1st 1999; the reform-implementation effect considers the implementation treatment 
starting on January 1st 1999. These two effects correspond to α2 and α3 in equation (1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
individual level. All of the regressions include individual and year fixed-effects. The controls include age dummies (in five-year bands), 
a dummy for the (lagged) presence of children in the household, health status, weekly working hours, the log of the monthly wage, and 
occupation and region dummies. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Total Effect of the reform -0.030* 0.027 0.004 0.000 -0.027** -0.892*** -0.028** -0.038** -0.033** -0.048*** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.029) (0.013) (0.323) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) 
Individual Time Variant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes . Yes Yes 
Individual Time Invariant Controls . . . . Yes . . . . . 
Individual Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes . Yes Yes . Yes Yes 
Couple Time Variant Controls . . . . . . . Yes . . 
Couple Fixed-effects . . . . . . . Yes . . 
Observations 4132 3866 5196 1971 4698 4698 5000 3884 4486 3444 
Individuals 915 895 1185 470 1040 1040 1114 . 997 776 
Couples . . . . . . . 908 . . 
Average Birth Probability in Control Group 0.067 0.060 0.071 0.094 0.070 0.070 0.053 0.068 0.068 0.071 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 21 and 49 (except in columns (2) to (4), where it is their Spanish, Italian and Danish 
counterparts). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level, except in columns (6) and (8); the latter is clustered at the couple level. The conditional FE logit results in column 
(6) refer to the log of the odds ratio. All of the regressions include year fixed effects. The controls include age dummies (in five-year bands), a dummy for the (lagged) presence of children in the 
household, health status, weekly working hours, the log of the monthly wage, and occupation and region dummies. The individual time-invariant controls in column (5) are gender and a dummy for 
post-secondary education. The couple time-varying controls in columns (8) include the individual time-varying controls for both the husband and the wife. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 7: The Rise in the Delalande Tax and Fertility – Heterogeneity 
Birth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Effect of the reform -0.046** -0.048** -0.011 -0.021 0.007 0.028 




Born before 1959 0.017 
(0.023) 
High Wage beforehand -0.044** 
(0.019) 
High Education beforehand -0.082*** 
(0.029) 
Parent beforehand -0.062*** 
(0.018) 
1 child beforehand -0.041 
(0.028) 
2 children beforehand -0.091*** 
(0.029) 
3+ children beforehand -0.094*** 
(0.033) 
Observations 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 
Individuals 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Average Birth Probability in Control Group 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 21 and 49. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. All of the regressions include individual and year fixed-effects. The controls 
include age dummies (in five-year bands), a dummy for the (lagged) presence of children in the household, health status, weekly working 




Figure A1: The Distribution of Perceived Job Security in the ECHP 
Note: This figure refers to French married and cohabiting private-sector workers 
under the age of 50 without missing values in the ECHP 1995-2001. 
Figure A2: The Delalande Tax and the Probability of Layoff  – OLS Results 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the 
French Labour Force Survey between the ages of 21 and 49. The number of 
observations is 136,836. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
individual level. All of the regressions include year fixed-effects. The controls 
include age dummies (in five-year bands), a dummy for the presence of children 
in the household, the log of the monthly wage, and département dummies. The 
confidence intervals indicate the 10% significance level. 
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Figure A3: Average Perceived Job Security by Treatment Group 
Notes: The short-dashed vertical line indicates the date at which the rise in the 
Delalande tax was announced while the long-dashed line indicates the date of its 
implementation. The points on the horizontal axis refer to the time of data 
collection of each ECHP wave (in November to December of each year). 
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Table A1: The Delalande Tax and Fertility – Panel results and full controls 
Birth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Reform Announcement -0.035 -0.038* -0.006 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.063) 
Reform Implementation -0.037** -0.041** -0.009 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.062) 
Total Effect of the reform -0.037** -0.040** -0.008 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.062) 
Age: 26-30 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.076 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Age: 31-35 0.076 0.075 0.073 0.073 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.083) 
Age: 36-40 0.099 0.099 0.097 0.097 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) 
Age: 41-45 0.087 0.087 0.084 0.084 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) 
Age: 46-49 0.097 0.098 0.097 0.094 
(0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
Monthly Wage (in log) -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Weekly Working Hours -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Self-Assessed Health [1-5] 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Presence of Children (lagged) -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.097*** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Perceived Job Security [1-6] -0.007 -0.010 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Perceived Job Security*Treat 0.012 0.012 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Perceived Job Security*1998 0.001 
(0.019) 
Perceived Job Security*Post 1998 0.009 
(0.012) 
Perceived Job Security*Reform Announcement -0.006 
(0.023) 
Perceived Job Security*Reform Implementation -0.008 
(0.015) 
Perceived Job Security*Post 1997 0.006 
(0.011) 
Perceived Job Security*Total Effect of the Reform -0.009 
(0.015) 
Observations 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 
Individuals 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Treatment dummy and Wave Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation and Region Fixed Effects . Yes . Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted Within R2 0.007 0.023 0.007 0.023 0.024 0.024 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 21 and 49. The announcement effect of the 
reform considers the treatment from the beginning of 1998, when the reform to the Delalande tax was announced, up to its implementation on 
January 1st 1999; the reform-implementation effect considers the implementation treatment starting on January 1st 1999. These two effects 
correspond to α2 and α3 in equation (1). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. All of the regressions include 
individual and year fixed-effects. The controls include age dummies (in five-year bands), health status, weekly working hours, the log of the 
monthly wage, and occupation and region dummies. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Placebo1997 0.008 0.020 
(0.024) (0.087) 
Observations 2386 2386 
Individuals 924 924 
Notes: The placebo experiment is run on only the 1995-1997 pre-announcement years, 
and pretends that that the reform took place on the 1st of January 1997. The sample here 
is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the French ECHP between the ages 
of 21 and 49. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. All of 
the regressions include individual and year fixed-effects. The controls include age 
dummies (in five-year bands), a dummy for the (lagged) presence of children in the 
household, health status, weekly working hours, the log of the monthly wage, and 
occupation and region dummies. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. 
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Table A3: Differences in observable characteristics between the treatment and control group before and after the reform’s announcement 
Before the announcement of the 
1999 rise in the Delalande tax 
After the announcement of the 
1999 rise in the Delalande tax 
Difference-in-
Differences 
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age 36.497 35.703 0.793*** 38.967 38.369 0.597** -0.196 
[4.968] [5.474] (0.214) [5.711] [6.182] (0.248) (0.327) 
Female 0.364 0.456 -0.091*** 0.359 0.421 -0.062*** 0.029 
[0.481] [0.498] (0.020) [0.480] [0.494] (0.020) (0.029) 
High Education 0.231 0.173 0.058*** 0.271 0.196 0.075*** 0.017 
[0.422] [0.378] (0.016) [0.444] [0.397] (0.018) (0.024) 
Health Status 3.891 3.865 0.025 3.824 3.816 0.007 -0.018 
[0.692] [0.735] (0.029) [0.646] [0.674] (0.027) (0.040) 
Weekly Working Hours 40.073 39.500 0.573 39.033 38.970 0.063 -0.509 
[7.411] [9.666] (0.354) [6.940] [9.003] (0.335) (0.487) 
Part-time 0.073 0.138 -0.066*** 0.065 0.130 -0.066*** -0.000 
[0.260] [0.345] (0.012) [0.246] [0.337] (0.013) (0.018) 
Monthly Wage (log) 9.096 8.867 0.229*** 9.232 8.994 0.238*** 0.009 
[0.451] [0.508] (0.020) [0.463] [0.529] (0.021) (0.029) 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 21 and 49. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and standard deviations are in square brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Total Effect of the reform -0.188*** 0.004 -0.021 0.027 -0.181*** -0.416*** -0.168*** -0.224*** -0.181*** -0.180** 
(0.069) (0.014) (0.025) (0.120) (0.013) (0.160) (0.054) (0.082) (0.068) (0.079) 
Individual Time Variant Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes . Yes Yes 
Individual Time Invariant Controls . . . . Yes Yes . . . . 
Individual Fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes . . Yes . Yes Yes 
Couple Time Variant Controls . . . . . . . Yes . . 
Couple Fixed-effects . . . . . . . Yes . . 
Observations 3174 4078 5451 1971 4968 4968 5000 3438 4486 3444 
Individuals 802 1219 1517 470 1040 1040 1114 . 997 776 
Couples . . . . . . 927 . 
Average Perceived Job Security in Control Group 4.033 4.612 3.995 4.955 4.070 4.070 5.051 4.055 4.080 4.160 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 21 and 49 (except in columns (2) to (4), where it is their Spanish, Italian and Danish 
counterparts). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level, except in column (8) which is clustered at the couple level. The Blow-Up and Cluster ordered logit results in column (6) 
refer to the log of the odds ratio and the number of observations is artificially higher due to the estimation method. All the regressions include year fixed effects. The controls include age dummies (in 
five-year bands), a dummy for the (lagged) presence of children in the household, health status, weekly working hours, the log of the monthly wage, and occupation and region dummies. The individual 
time-invaryiant controls in column (5) include gender and education dummies. The couple time-varying controls in column (8) include the individual time-varying controls for both the husband and the 
wife. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table A5: The Rise in the Delalande Tax and Perceived Job Security – Heterogeneity 
Birth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Effect of the reform -0.166** -0.231*** -0.195** -0.191*** -0.216** -0.264** 




Born before 1959 0.091 
(0.098) 
High Wage beforehand 0.018 
(0.093) 
High Education beforehand 0.028 
(0.098) 
Parent beforehand 0.041 
(0.104) 
1 child beforehand -0.009 
(0.151) 
2 children beforehand 0.177 
(0.136) 
3+ children beforehand 0.019 
(0.152) 
Observations 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 
Individuals 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 
Average Perceived Job Security in Control Group 4.070 4.070 4.070 4.070 4.070 4.070 
Notes: The sample here is married and cohabiting private-sector workers in the French ECHP between the ages of 21 and 49. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the individual level. All of the regressions include individual and year fixed-effects. The controls include age 
dummies (in five-year bands), a dummy for the (lagged) presence of children in the household, health status, weekly working hours, the log of 
the monthly wage, and occupation and region dummies. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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